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Abstract 
Cortical	  plasticity	  is	  often	  invoked	  to	  explain	  changes	  in	  the	  quality	  or	  location	  of	  
experience	  observed	  in	  rewired	  animals,	  in	  sensory	  substitution,	  in	  extension	  of	  the	  body	  
through	  tool	  use,	  and	  in	  the	  rubber	  hand	  illusion.	  However	  this	  appeal	  to	  cortical	  plasticity	  
may	  be	  misleading,	  because	  it	  suggest	  that	  the	  cortical	  areas	  that	  are	  plastic	  are	  
themselves	  the	  loci	  of	  generation	  of	  experience.	  This	  would	  be	  an	  error,	  I	  claim,	  since	  
cortical	  areas	  do	  not	  generate	  experience.	  Cortical	  areas	  participate	  in	  enabling	  the	  
interaction	  of	  an	  agent	  with	  its	  environment,	  and	  the	  quality	  of	  this	  interaction	  constitutes	  
the	  quality	  of	  experience.	  Thus	  it	  is	  not	  plasticity	  in	  itself,	  but	  the	  change	  in	  modes	  of	  
interaction	  which	  plasticity	  allows,	  which	  gives	  rise	  to	  the	  change	  of	  experience	  observed	  in	  
these	  studies.	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  William	  James	  said	  that	  if	  we	  were	  able	  to	  re-­‐direct	  nerves	  from	  the	  eye	  so	  that	  they	  connected	  to	  the	  brain	  centres	  concerned	  with	  hearing,	  and	  vice	  versa,	  then	  we	  would	  “hear	  the	  lightning	  and	  see	  the	  thunder”	  (James,	  1890).	  	  Underlying	  this	  statement	  is	  the	  idea	  that	  what	  determines	  the	  quality	  of	  sensations	  is	  the	  particular	  brain	  area	  that	  processes	  the	  neural	  influx.	  Since	  James’	  time,	  an	  enormous	  literature	  has	  lent	  support	  to	  this	  idea,	  including	  several	  iconic	  results.	  Among	  these	  is	  Penfield’s	  	  demonstration	  that	  tactile	  sensations	  in	  different	  body	  locations	  can	  be	  elicited	  by	  stimulation	  of	  corresponding	  areas	  of	  a	  somatosensory	  map	  or	  “Penfield	  homunculus”,	  and	  that	  stimulation	  of	  other	  areas	  can	  actually	  generate	  visual	  or	  auditory	  experiences	  (Penfield,	  1958).	  	  Since	  those	  days	  the	  idea	  of	  “localisation	  of	  function”	  in	  the	  brain	  has	  become	  a	  doctrine	  (cf.	  Phillips,	  Zeki,	  &	  Barlow,	  1984),	  with	  a	  large	  portion	  of	  neuroscience	  research	  devoted	  to	  determining	  the	  particular	  functions	  of	  the	  different	  brain	  areas.	  	  Applied	  to	  perception,	  the	  localisation	  of	  function	  doctrine	  is	  often	  taken	  to	  suggest	  that	  there	  is	  something	  special	  about	  each	  kind	  of	  cortex	  that	  underlies	  the	  particular	  quality	  of	  sensations	  that	  that	  kind	  of	  cortex	  allows.	  Just	  as	  there	  is	  something	  special	  about	  Penfield’s	  somatosensory	  cortex	  which	  allows	  it	  to	  generate	  tactile	  sensations,	  there	  is	  something	  special	  about	  visual,	  auditory,	  etc.,	  cortices	  which	  allows	  them	  to	  generate	  visual,	  auditory,	  etc.,	  sensations.	  Within	  this	  way	  of	  thinking,	  the	  studies	  of	  “rewired”	  animals	  and	  visual	  cortex	  in	  blind	  individuals	  have	  added	  an	  interesting	  twist,	  which	  reveals	  a	  subtle	  issue	  concerning	  the	  causal	  status	  of	  the	  notion	  of	  cortical	  plasticity.	  
Rewired animals and visual cortex in blind persons 
The	  studies	  of	  rewired	  animals	  investigate	  what	  happens	  when	  animals	  are	  surgically	  rewired	  at	  birth	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  information	  from	  the	  eyes,	  usually	  transmitted	  to	  visual	  cortex,	  is	  re-­‐routed	  so	  that	  it	  projects	  into	  auditory	  cortex	  (Frost,	  Boire,	  Gingras,	  &	  Ptito,	  2000;	  Pallas,	  Roe,	  &	  Sur,	  1990;	  Pallas	  &	  Sur,	  1993;	  Sharma,	  Angelucci,	  &	  Sur,	  2000).	  The	  results	  show	  that	  when	  mature,	  the	  re-­‐wired	  animals	  are	  able	  to	  perform	  visual	  behaviours	  almost	  as	  efficiently	  as	  normal	  animals	  using	  their	  visual	  cortex.	  	  Furthermore,	  the	  rewired	  auditory	  cortex	  reorganises	  and	  displays	  a	  two-­‐dimensional	  orientation-­‐sensitive	  structure	  similar	  to	  that	  observed	  in	  normal	  visual	  cortex.	  	  Of	  particular	  interest	  is	  one	  very	  ingenious	  study	  which	  was	  able	  to	  approach	  an	  answer	  to	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  the	  quality	  of	  the	  sensations	  experienced	  by	  such	  rewired	  animals	  via	  their	  auditory	  cortex	  was	  actually	  visual	  rather	  than	  auditory	  (von	  Melchner,	  Pallas,	  &	  Sur,	  2000).	  The	  authors	  used	  ferrets	  that	  were	  only	  rewired	  in	  one	  hemisphere.	  They	  first	  trained	  these	  animals	  to	  distinguish	  between	  sounds	  and	  lights	  that	  were	  presented	  in	  such	  a	  way	  as	  to	  be	  processed	  only	  by	  the	  normal	  hemisphere.	  When	  completely	  trained,	  the	  animals	  were	  tested	  with	  lights	  that	  were	  processed	  only	  by	  the	  rewired	  hemisphere,	  that	  is,	  through	  auditory	  cortex.	  The	  animals	  invariably	  turned	  in	  a	  way	  suggesting	  that	  they	  perceived	  the	  lights	  visually,	  even	  though	  the	  perception	  occurred	  via	  their	  auditory	  cortex.	  When	  the	  auditory	  cortex	  was	  removed,	  the	  animals	  behaved	  as	  though	  they	  were	  blind.	  	  	  Note	  that	  the	  authors	  did	  not	  observe	  any	  lateral	  connections	  between	  the	  “converted”	  auditory	  cortex	  and	  existing	  visual	  cortex.	  Thus	  it	  truly	  appears	  that	  the	  visual	  sensations	  were	  related	  to	  the	  presence	  of	  the	  auditory	  cortex,	  and	  not	  to	  stimulation	  spreading	  to	  visual	  cortex.	  We	  thus	  seem	  to	  have	  a	  case	  in	  which,	  contrary	  to	  William	  James’s	  prediction,	  it	  seems	  that	  the	  animals	  end	  up	  “seeing	  the	  lightning	  rather	  than	  hearing	  it”.	  	  Another	  well-­‐publicised	  result	  showing	  adaptation	  of	  sensation	  generated	  in	  cortical	  areas	  has	  emerged	  recently	  in	  studies	  on	  blind	  people.	  For	  such	  persons	  it	  has	  been	  shown	  that	  visual	  cortex	  can	  rewire	  itself	  so	  as	  to	  participate	  in	  other	  functions,	  including	  language	  processing,	  memory,	  motion	  detection	  and	  navigation.	  The	  results	  are	  particularly	  strong	  in	  the	  congenitally	  blind,	  where	  visual	  cortex	  has	  never	  been	  exposed	  to	  visual	  stimulation.	  Of	  interest	  as	  regards	  the	  question	  of	  the	  experienced	  quality	  of	  sensations	  are	  the	  results	  of	  Kupers	  et	  al.	  (2006)	  and	  Ptito,	  Schneider,	  Paulson,	  &	  Kupers	  (2008).	  They	  trained	  subjects	  to	  use	  a	  sensory	  substitution	  device	  called	  the	  “Tongue	  Display	  Unit”,	  which	  converts	  visual	  stimuli	  captured	  by	  a	  video	  camera	  into	  tactile	  stimulation	  on	  the	  tongue.	  After	  learning	  to	  do	  orientation,	  form	  or	  motion	  discrimination	  tasks	  with	  the	  device,	  early	  blind	  subjects	  given	  Transcranial	  Magnetic	  Stimulation	  (TMS)	  directed	  onto	  their	  visual	  cortex	  felt	  tingling	  sensations	  on	  their	  tongue.	  Visual	  cortex	  thus	  seems	  now	  to	  underlie	  the	  generation	  of	  tactile	  sensations	  on	  the	  tongue.	  
Cortical plasticity All	  these	  results	  show	  that	  whatever	  it	  is	  about	  a	  particular	  cortical	  area	  that	  gives	  rise	  to	  a	  particular	  quality	  of	  sensation	  (e.g.	  visual,	  auditory,	  tactile),	  it	  does	  not	  lie	  in	  the	  specific	  cortical	  area	  or	  type	  of	  neurons,	  but	  in	  something	  that	  can	  be	  modified	  as	  a	  function	  of	  adaptation	  to	  extrinsic	  stimulation.	  As	  noted	  by	  Hurley	  &	  Noë	  (2003),	  the	  cortex	  “defers”	  to	  the	  particular	  sensory	  input	  channel.	  Such	  a	  modification	  is	  generally	  referred	  to	  as	  being	  an	  instance	  of	  “cortical	  plasticity”.	  	  Researchers	  will	  tend	  to	  say	  that	  cortical	  plasticity	  has	  allowed	  auditory	  cortex	  to	  change	  its	  function,	  going	  from	  generating	  auditory	  sensations	  to	  generating	  visual	  sensations.	  The	  implicit	  underlying	  assumption	  is	  that	  cortex	  generates	  sensations,	  and	  so	  to	  have	  different	  sensations,	  cortex	  must	  change	  its	  mode	  of	  functioning.	  But	  to	  say	  this	  is	  to	  fall	  into	  a	  “category	  mistake”	  (Ryle,	  1949).	  	  For	  suppose	  it	  made	  sense	  to	  say	  that	  different	  cortical	  areas	  “generated”	  different	  types	  of	  sensations.	  Then	  we	  would	  be	  faced	  with	  the	  problem	  of	  explaining	  exactly	  how	  this	  came	  about.	  Exactly	  what	  is	  it	  about	  the	  
different	  areas	  that	  allows	  them	  to	  generate	  the	  particular	  sensations	  they	  provide?	  This	  is	  the	  vexed	  problem	  of	  “qualia”,	  for	  which	  a	  variety	  of	  esoteric	  hypotheses	  have	  been	  advanced,	  going	  from	  quantum	  gravity	  effects	  in	  microtubules,	  through	  synchronous	  oscillations	  in	  widespread	  cortical	  areas,	  to	  cortico-­‐thalamic	  reverberations	  -­‐-­‐	  see	  the	  list	  provided	  by	  Chalmers	  (1997).	  For	  any	  such	  hypothesis,	  as	  noted	  by	  Dennett	  (1991),	  an	  infinite	  regress	  of	  questions	  (“And	  then	  what	  happens?”)	  can	  always	  be	  asked	  about	  what	  exactly	  it	  is	  about	  these	  mechanisms	  that	  produces	  feel	  rather	  than	  no	  feel?	  And	  why	  are	  the	  feels	  the	  way	  they	  are,	  rather	  than	  some	  other	  way?	  Any	  explanation	  for	  similarities	  and	  differences	  in	  feels	  that	  is	  made	  in	  terms	  of	  physico-­‐chemical	  mechanisms	  requires	  making	  a	  link	  between	  the	  language	  of	  neural	  processes	  and	  the	  language	  of	  sensations:	  and	  there	  is	  no	  non-­‐arbitrary	  way	  to	  make	  that	  link.	  	  For	  that	  reason	  the	  sensorimotor	  approach	  (O’Regan	  &	  Noë,	  2001;	  O’Regan,	  2011)	  proposes	  to	  reject	  the	  notion	  that	  sensations	  are	  the	  kinds	  of	  things	  that	  can	  be	  generated.	  	  The	  sensorimotor	  approach	  proposes	  instead	  that	  it	  is	  scientifically	  more	  fruitful	  to	  consider	  the	  qualities	  of	  sensations	  as	  laws	  of	  interaction	  with	  the	  world.	  For	  example	  the	  sensation	  of	  softness	  consists	  in	  the	  law	  that	  links	  the	  sensory	  inputs	  you	  receive	  from	  your	  fingers	  with	  the	  pressure	  you	  exert	  on	  the	  sponge.	  The	  sponge	  is	  soft	  if	  it	  squishes	  under	  your	  fingers.	  Taking	  this	  stance	  is	  not	  just	  a	  philosophical	  trick,	  it	  actually	  leads	  to	  scientific	  predictions	  and	  paradigms,	  like	  the	  work	  on	  change	  blindness,	  inattentional	  blindness,	  sensory	  substitution	  and	  color	  psychophysics.	  In	  conclusion	  then,	  if	  the	  sensorimotor	  approach	  is	  correct,	  then	  it	  is	  misleading	  to	  say	  that	  in	  rewired	  animals	  cortical	  plasticity	  has	  allowed	  “auditory	  cortex	  to	  change	  its	  function,	  going	  from	  generating	  auditory	  sensations	  to	  generating	  visual	  sensations.”	  	  	  
The real cause What	  then	  is	  the	  correct	  thing	  to	  say	  about	  what	  happens	  with	  re-­‐wired	  animals?	  We	  must	  say	  that	  the	  animal	  has	  become	  able	  to	  use	  its	  auditory	  cortex	  instead	  of	  its	  visual	  cortex	  in	  overseeing	  the	  sensorimotor	  interactions	  it	  has	  with	  the	  world	  using	  its	  eyes.	  Initially	  it	  tries	  to	  react	  appropriately	  to	  input	  from	  the	  eyes,	  but	  because	  at	  first	  auditory	  cortex	  is	  not	  wired	  up	  to	  do	  the	  task	  efficiently,	  the	  animal	  does	  not	  process	  the	  input	  nor	  react	  quite	  as	  efficiently	  as	  if	  it	  were	  using	  visual	  cortex.	  But	  gradually	  there	  is	  learning,	  and	  auditory	  cortex	  reorganises	  itself	  to	  do	  the	  task	  more	  efficiently.	  When	  things	  stabilize	  however,	  it	  would	  be	  a	  mistake	  to	  say	  that	  auditory	  cortex	  was	  “generating”	  visual	  qualia.	  No:	  auditory	  cortex	  is	  now	  participating	  in	  visual-­‐type	  interactions	  in	  a	  way	  that	  is	  almost	  as	  efficient	  as	  visual	  cortex	  usually	  would	  be.	  Such	  a	  situation	  is	  called	  “seeing”.	  Of	  course	  we	  could	  call	  the	  change	  from	  inefficient	  to	  efficient	  use	  of	  the	  auditory	  cortex	  “cortical	  plasticity”.	  But	  it	  is	  important	  to	  be	  aware	  that	  this	  “plasticity”	  is	  not	  in	  itself	  what	  is	  causing	  the	  transition	  to	  seeing	  with	  the	  auditory	  cortex.	  The	  plasticity	  is	  allowing	  the	  animal	  to	  interact	  in	  a	  visual	  fashion,	  but	  it	  is	  not	  effecting	  a	  magical	  transition	  from	  generating	  auditory	  to	  generating	  visual	  qualia.	  Indeed	  there	  is	  another	  argument	  supporting	  the	  view	  that	  cortical	  plasticity	  is	  not	  the	  cause	  of	  the	  radical	  changes	  in	  sensory	  quality	  observed	  in	  rewired	  animals.	  It	  comes	  from	  other	  phenomena	  where	  drastic	  changes	  in	  the	  locus,	  modality	  or	  nature	  of	  sensations	  can	  occur	  in	  a	  very	  short	  time,	  making	  cortical	  plasticity,	  which	  is	  presumably	  a	  fairly	  slow	  process,	  a	  highly	  unlikely	  cause.	  One	  such	  phenomenon	  is	  the	  feeling	  of	  “projecting”	  your	  tactile	  sensation	  onto	  the	  tip	  of	  a	  tool:	  for	  example,	  when	  you	  write,	  you	  feel	  the	  roughness	  of	  the	  paper	  at	  the	  tip	  of	  the	  pen:	  and	  this	  happens	  even	  though	  you	  may	  hold	  the	  pen	  in	  any	  number	  of	  ways,	  and	  even	  though	  the	  vibrations	  from	  the	  paper	  are	  transmitted	  to	  widely	  different	  areas	  of	  your	  hand.	  The	  effect	  is	  immediate	  on	  setting	  pen	  to	  paper,	  and	  is	  thus	  presumably	  not	  the	  product	  of	  cortical	  plasticity.	  A	  similar	  example	  is	  the	  feeling	  you	  get	  immediately	  after	  learning	  to	  drive,	  of	  the	  tires	  touching	  
the	  road	  or	  the	  curb	  when	  you	  park	  your	  car.	  The	  rapidity	  of	  these	  adaptations	  argues	  against	  cortical	  plasticity	  as	  an	  explanation.	  	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  cortical	  plasticity	  does	  of	  course	  occur.	  As	  has	  been	  shown	  by	  an	  extensive	  literature,	  cortical	  changes	  occur	  when	  you	  use	  a	  tool:	  receptive	  fields	  normally	  situated	  at	  the	  hand	  can	  extend	  to	  the	  end	  of	  the	  tool	  (cf.	  Maravita	  &	  Iriki,	  2004).	  This	  cortical	  plasticity,	  which	  may	  take	  weeks	  to	  set	  up	  in	  a	  macaque	  monkey,	  participates	  in	  improving	  the	  monkey’s	  ability	  to	  move	  objects	  with	  a	  rake.	  But	  it	  is	  not	  this	  cortical	  plasticity	  which	  is	  the	  original	  cause	  of	  a	  change	  in	  felt	  location	  of	  touch.	  On	  the	  contrary,	  the	  felt	  location	  of	  touch	  is	  the	  brain’s	  way	  of	  best	  accounting	  for	  the	  currently	  occurring	  sensorimotor	  contingencies.	  Cortical	  plasticity	  may	  improve	  this	  estimation,	  but	  it	  is	  not	  itself	  the	  cause	  of	  the	  change	  in	  sensation.	  	  The	  rubber	  hand	  illusion	  is	  another	  example:	  in	  this	  illusion,	  which	  takes	  only	  minutes	  to	  establish,	  touch	  actually	  occurs	  on	  the	  observer’s	  arm,	  but	  is	  perceived	  as	  occurring	  on	  the	  rubber	  arm	  (Botvinick	  &	  Cohen,	  1998).	  This	  is	  not	  because	  of	  cortical	  plasticity,	  but	  because	  the	  sensorimotor	  contingencies	  established	  artificially	  by	  the	  experimental	  manipulation	  can	  best	  be	  interpreted	  by	  the	  brain	  in	  terms	  of	  touch	  on	  the	  rubber	  arm	  rather	  than	  on	  the	  observer’s	  arm.	  Finally	  sensory	  substitution,	  though	  often	  “explained”	  in	  terms	  of	  cortical	  plasticity	  (Bach-­‐y-­‐Rita,	  Danilov,	  Tyler,	  &	  Grimm,	  2005;	  Bach-­‐y-­‐Rita,	  1972),	  is	  in	  fact	  also	  not	  essentially	  caused	  by	  cortical	  plasticity.	  People	  using	  the	  TVSS	  or	  the	  vOICe	  report	  after	  only	  a	  few	  hours,	  if	  not	  within	  minutes,	  that	  they	  are	  getting	  “something	  like”	  a	  visual	  sensation.	  Of	  course	  the	  sensation	  can	  only	  be	  visual	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  the	  apparatus,	  and	  the	  observer’s	  motor,	  sensory	  and	  cognitive	  faculties	  allow	  the	  interaction	  to	  approximate	  visual-­‐type	  interactions	  with	  the	  world.	  But	  the	  effect	  occurs	  almost	  immediately,	  and	  is	  thus	  presumably	  not	  caused	  by	  cortical	  plasticity.	  Again,	  it	  is	  of	  course	  the	  case	  that	  over	  time,	  when	  a	  person	  becomes	  experienced	  with	  sensory	  substitution	  devices,	  cortical	  changes	  will	  occur.	  Brain	  structures	  will	  adapt	  so	  as	  to	  more	  efficiently	  do	  the	  processing	  involved	  in	  entertaining	  interaction	  with	  the	  world	  corresponding	  to	  the	  perceived	  modality.	  The	  experienced	  sensation	  will	  then	  more	  accurately	  approximate	  the	  normal	  sensation	  in	  that	  modality.	  But	  again,	  the	  cause	  for	  the	  experienced	  sensations	  lies	  not	  in	  the	  plasticity	  itself,	  but	  in	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  plasticity	  has	  enabled	  a	  mode	  of	  interaction	  with	  the	  environment	  which	  better	  approximates	  the	  new	  sensory	  modality.	  
Conclusion It	  seems	  that	  the	  notion	  of	  cortical	  plasticity	  that	  researchers	  often	  refer	  to	  in	  the	  context	  of	  rewiring	  and	  sensory	  substitution	  may	  be	  somewhat	  misleading.	  Whereas	  the	  dramatic	  changes	  in	  experienced	  sensations	  seem	  to	  warrant	  appeal	  to	  some	  equally	  significant	  cortical	  modifications,	  I	  claim	  that	  taking	  this	  view	  would	  be	  to	  fall	  into	  Ryle’s	  category	  mistake	  of	  thinking	  that	  sensations	  are	  the	  kinds	  of	  things	  that	  can	  be	  generated	  in	  the	  brain.	  In	  fact,	  if	  we	  admit	  that	  the	  quality	  of	  sensory	  experiences	  are	  constituted	  by	  the	  modes	  of	  interaction	  with	  the	  environment	  that	  they	  involve,	  then	  we	  see	  that	  the	  real	  cause	  of	  modification	  of	  sensations	  in	  cases	  like	  rewired	  animals	  and	  sensory	  substitution	  will	  necessarily	  lie	  in	  changes	  in	  the	  modes	  of	  interaction	  which	  are	  involved.	  These	  changes	  in	  modes	  of	  interaction	  can	  be	  enabled,	  or	  favored	  by	  cortical	  plasticity,	  but	  cortical	  plasticity	  is	  not	  in	  itself	  what	  causes	  the	  changes.	  What	  causes	  the	  modification	  in	  sensory	  experience	  is	  just	  the	  fact	  that,	  through	  the	  use	  of	  special	  instrumentation	  or	  interfaces,	  a	  person	  or	  an	  animal	  interacts	  with	  the	  world	  in	  a	  way	  which	  approximates	  a	  sensory	  modality	  that	  involves	  cortical	  areas	  or	  sensory	  apparatus	  usually	  used	  for	  other	  modalities.	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